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
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***Gravity's Rainbow* in the light of speech act theory**

Abdol Hossein Joodaki¹ · Hamideh Mahdiani¹

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Abstract In modern secular societies, social order rests primarily on communicative action and discourse, which together help establish and maintain social integrity, that is, they act like glue that keeps society together. Any deficiency in this communicative interaction, however, would baulk at society's ideals of equilibrium, justice, and individual development. This article attempts to identify the particular locutionary system used in Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* from the perspective of two theories. Using Austin's theories of locution, illocution, and perlocution allied with Habermas's ideas on communication to analyze the novel, this study attempts to show that it is mostly Pynchon's choice of locution that renders his goal of showing how much modern life has been torn away from healthy and genuine communicative actions and been replaced by strategic actions, and consequently, creating the system and ruining the lifeworld, in Habermas' terms.

Keywords Austin's speech act theory · Habermas's communicative rationality · System · Lifeworld

Introduction

In *Gravity's Rainbow*, a host of nearly 400 characters attempts to track down the firing site of a mysterious model of the German V-2 rocket during World War II. Among the prominent characters are Tyrone Slothrop, an American whose Puritan ancestry has conferred on him a peculiar sensitivity to deadly missiles and Captain Blicero, a Nazi weapons genius, who is linked in turn to Enzian, an African rocket expert, and to Tchitcherine, a Red Army officer. This grouping enables Pynchon to explore patterns of American, European, and Soviet dominance over the Third

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World countries established by flamboyant technology or extravagant bureaucracies. Nationalities abound in the pages of *Gravity's Rainbow*: Kirghiz tribesmen from Central Asia and Herero emigrants from South-West Africa encounter Argentinians, Russians, and Europeans of every description. As they chase each other and the ultimate V-2 across national borders, over continents, and into the recesses of multinational corporations, these characters reveal the degree of Pynchon's concern with the modern human condition and with the past that has shaped it; also, by pitting characters from kaleidoscopic backgrounds against each other Pynchon wants to show how the communicative system of modern times has changed from what it used to be.

Attempting to analyze the motive behind the characters' actions, the article uses Austin's speech act theory combined with Habermas's theory of communicative action to better delineate the characters' encounters with each other and the world outside. To begin with Austin himself, he says "it has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like". To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the «descriptive» fallacy (Austin 3). Therefore, to Austin, many circumstantial elements are at work in the formation of communication; and for a communication to be genuine, one should take into account all these influential elements.

One of those critics who help us to better understand Austin's theory is Georgia Warnke. To him "Austin distinguishes the locutionary aspect of a speech act, which designates its propositional content from its illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects. By its illocutionary aspect, he refers to such actions as promising, avowing, or commanding. By perlocutionary acts, Austin designates the effect the speaker produces on the hearer" (Cambridge Companion to Habermas, 121). For example, if somebody shouts fire and people run in reaction to this speech, it means that they have acted in response to that discourse. Another example that would better explain illocutionary as well as perlocutionary aspects of a speech act and would show the subtle differences between them is the one explicated by Katharine Gelber:

In another example, if a jury foreperson declares 'guilty' in a courtroom in which an accused person sits, the illocutionary act of declaring a person guilty of a crime has been undertaken. The perlocutionary act related to that illocution is that, in reasonable circumstances, the accused person would be convinced that they were to be led from the courtroom into a jail cell. Perlocutionary acts are acts intrinsically related to the illocutionary act which precedes them, but discrete and able to be differentiated from the illocutionary act (56).

Somehow in line with Austin's theory and in a sense complementary to it are Habermas' ideas on communication. On this ground, the critic Warnke enlightens us:

For his part, Habermas distinguishes between two sorts of illocutionary effect - first, the understanding and, second the acceptance of a speech act offer and three sorts of perlocutionary effect. Perlocutionary effect I refers to that effect that the speech act produces on the hearer merely because of what follows from its meaning; this sort of perlocutionary effect thus counts as a grammatically regulated one. By a perlocutionary effect II, Habermas refers to an effect on the hearer that is not grammatically legislated by the speech act itself but that could be revealed to the participants in the communication without affecting their understanding and acceptance of the speech act offer. Finally, perlocutionary effects III refer to those effects that are not grammatically legislated by the speech act and that could not be revealed to the participants in the communication without affecting their understanding and acceptance of the speech act offer (Warnke 121).

As can be inferred, Habermas' emphasis is mostly on the third kind of perlocutionary effect, because it is through this communicative strategy that those who are in charge of the communicative process can manipulate the participants and lead them to wherever they desire. One should bear in mind that this perlocutionary effect is very subtly achieved through circumstantial conditions unknown to the participant as well as through unconscious reactions enacted on the part of the participant.

In different terminologies but still echoing Warnke's assumption of Austin theory of speech act, Kenneth Mackendrick in his essay "The Moral Imaginary of Discourse Ethics" lays special emphasis upon Jorgen Habermas' account of communicative power of language and his consciousness of two distinctive spheres, that is, a duality between communicative rationality which, as Mackendrick puts it, has to do with an 'ideal moral philosophy' and 'strategic action' which in Habermas' words, implies an 'instrumental' or 'parasitic' use of language. Mackendrick contends that:

The moral imaginary of discourse ethics is shaped by a relentless interest in calling one another into account. Responsibility linked with autonomy and solidarity, are the regulative ideals that shape Habermas' moral theory. Habermas has argued that such regulative ideals are presuppositions of the communicative use of reason, embedded in the idea of mutual recognition. (268)

Unlike Marx who believed that the only thing essential for constituting the humanity of human being, to make him stand distinctive among other animals is 'to work', Habermas does not intend to encapsulate humanity within the frames of labor-bourgeois clashes and contends that there is another critical underlying element, language, which enables humanity to be rigorously distinctive among all other creatures, and that enables him to undertake change not only in his predicament in the universe but also attribute to language a power to change the universe he lives in. He assumes that language, as the unique characterization of humanity is capable of suggestions and implications through which communications take place, which in turn entails and leads to human knowledge. Habermas,

however, complies that the ultimate purpose of language is not a communication for the sake of communication. Being conscious of the communicative force of language Habermas conceives that the spiral of undesired discourses dominating the society such as war, violence and the like, are the consequent result of constitutionalized or strategic function of language the legitimacy of which is taken from its semantic potential. Concerning this, Habermas brings many evidences from Walter Benjamin to imply that language possesses a dynamic function to perform. He argues that:

In the early essay "Toward a Critique of Violence," Benjamin differentiates law-making violence from law-keeping violence. The latter is the legitimate violence exercised by the organs of the state; the former is the structural violence set loose in war and civil strife, which is present latently [suggested by the communicative function of language] in all institutions. (Habermas 1983a 153)

Also in his criticism on Hannah Arndt, Habermas proceeds to develop the extremes of communicative capacity of language to the point that he sees Arndt as usefully placing emphasis on the origin of power as opposed to its means of employment. He asserts that unlike Max Weber who understands power as an individual demand of achieving fixed goal, Arndt views power as what Habermas calls it, "Communicative action". Habermas observes that:

The concept of communicatively engendered power developed by Arndt can be made into a sharp instrument only if it is dissociated from the theory of action inspired by Aristotle. Arndt can reduce political power exclusively to praxis, the mutual speech and mutual action of individuals with one another, because she sets off praxis against the apolitical activities of production and labor on one side and of thought on the other. (Habermas 1983b 179)

Critique

Generally speaking, for Pynchon, the self resembles cybernetic unit receiving and ordering information. As technological advances increase information, Henry Adams's industrial multiplicities become exponential in a postindustrial era. Information on so vast a scale threatens continually to overload the self, which must try to pattern the flow into meaning. Increasing this danger is the nature of the information itself, the signs and symbols by which individuals perceive the systems and structures of the world.

On the one hand, in *Gravity's Rainbow*, Pynchon's use of incomplete sentences shows how much the characters are far from having the desirable communicative actions. Taking a quick look at any part of the book, one realizes that she/he cannot wholly grasp the meaning behind it since the sentences are incomplete or they simply do not make sense. Take the very first chapter for example, it starts:

Screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now. It is too late. The evacuation still proceeds, but it's all

theatre. There are no lights inside the cars. No light anywhere. Above him lift girders old as an iron queen, and glass somewhere far above that would let the light of day through. But it's night. He's afraid of the way the glass will fall—soon—it will be a spectacle: the fall of a crystal palace. But coming down in total blackout, without one glint of light, only great invisible crashing (Pynchon 1).

We need to move on to find that it is part of Pirate Prentice's dreams; and though we have no idea what is going on, we have to read the whole chapter about banana breakfast. This excerpt, though succinct, can be taken as a microcosm for the whole novel. As this article takes it for granted, *Gravity's Rainbow* is mostly obsessed with the idea of communication and its failure in the postmodern world, and as this passage denotes, the world of the novel is overwhelmed by an all-out darkness which has subsumed all human connection and exhausted human potentiality for genuine communication. Furthermore, latent within this short quotation, conspicuous and tangible throughout the novel, is the role of technology in human life. The screaming at the outset is indicative of human fear of death and destruction by products of technology. To Pynchon, technology is like the two-edged sword whose potential for destruction outweighs its potential for construction.

There are numerous accounts of deficient and manipulated locutions. In the case of Slothrop, his physical condition of being a child in his adult life is the first clue of manipulated locutions. In Chapter Fifteen he says: "Through the orange shades, someone is watching" (120). Later in Chapter Twenty-Two, in his fake saving of Katjie we read: "oh that was no Found crab, Ace—no random octopus" (188). And a girl indicates the same theme of manipulation: "There are times when Slothrop can actually find a clutch mechanism between him and their iron cased engine far away up a power train whose shape and design him can only guess at. They want something and he suspects something really bad has happened to him in the past. He's always been snuggling up, to the disagreeable idea that he was under someone else's control" (Pynchon 149).

Gradually, however, Slothrop comes to be self-conscious of the chicanery and manipulation imposed on him, as is seen in Chapter Twenty-Six. Now it appears that the war, perhaps the world itself, is nothing more than a vast conspiracy between the corporations. Slothrop can feel a beast in the sky: "its visible claws and scales are being mistaken for clouds and other plausibilities... or else everyone has agreed to call them other names when Slothrop is listening" (242). The locutions are manipulated so much that he has lost track of the reality and unreality and has started to develop hypotheses for himself but as seen later in Chapter Twenty-Eight in proverbs for Paranoid 3 "If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers" (252). Even though he has taken a fake I as Ian Scuffling, Slothrop sees that there is even more being zeroed in on him from out there than he had thought and gets to know the real extent of Jamf's complicity in the conspiracy.

Having tried in vain to find the rationality behind all the corporations manipulating his world, Slothrop is found in Berlin in Chapter Forty-One where he perceives that he is losing his mind. "If there is something comforting about

paranoia, there is still anti-paranoia, where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long. That's where Slothrop is" (434). Here one can observe the sense of disintegration on the part of Slothrop himself and the world in which he is engaged.

There are strategies taken by individuals, however, which help them break free of the imposed manacles imposed by the elite, for example through profanation, uttering an obscenity, which is an illocutionary act that violates a taboo of the official culture, and in doing so, silently acknowledges allegiance with the entire counterculture of the dispossessed, those for whom the words are not threatening but comforting. Since so much of the power of the elite arises from their control of the authoritative discourse, the breaking free of discursive decorum possesses at least symbolic significance.

There are also the accounts of Herero's words or the imposition of the new Turkish alphabet on the Kirghiz tribesmen. The last episode has similarity to what goes on in *The Crying of Lot 49*. The distinctions are that in the earlier novel, America is shifting from a script-print stage to an electronic stage, while the Kirghiz are moving from an oral-aural to a script-print stage. Furthermore, since Soviets force the Kirghiz, there is no doubt, as there is in the American case, as to the sinister import, to their further use of perlocutionary effect III. Such colonialism has been a constant in Pynchon's fiction and, not incidentally, a theme among linguists and media specialists from Harold Innis (*Empire and Communications*) to Noam Chomsky (*American Power and the New Mandarins*). The corollary is that language is one of the structures that political systems can manipulate to oppress people.

According to Maureen Quilligan, in her *Twentieth Century American Allegory*, Pynchon believes that an archive such as an alphabet produces a kind of bureaucratic effect on the 'archive' of the tribe's language, an archive which encompasses more than just spoken logos to include song, dance, and the unrepresentable 'Kirghiz Light', which is a frontier between the written and the spoken. Thus, Pynchon argues against the removal of that archive from democratic contexts by 'Elect' and bureaucratic control. The 'Kirghiz Light' appears gradually, like a sunrise casting long and terrifying 'Brocken-specters' and 'god-shadows'; it does not appear suddenly, with a simultaneous and apocalyptic bang, as in the epiphanic episodes of myth. Still, Tchitcherine attempts to transcribe the event, Quilligan points out, despite the fact that "[t]he Aqyn's song is itself about wordlessness". Thus, 'Slothrop's Russian counterpart' is requested to serve on a committee setting this oral language into 'a New Turkic Alphabet' (Quilligan 205).

She further adds that it is Pynchon's allegorical task to describe that 'mechanical reproduction', which actually does extend beyond mass movies and mass culture to 'language', so that, as Quilligan puts it, "through alphabetization, the means of human communication get bureaucratized" (206). Going ahead, one can see Pynchon speaking in his own language about this process, quoting a small part of the same passage that Quilligan includes in her own, because it appears so exemplary for our topic: "Tchitcherine one morning finds all the pencils in his conference room have mysteriously vanished. In revenge, he and Radnichy sneak in Blobadjian's conference room next night with hacksaws, files and torches, and reform the alphabet on his typewriter" (Pynchon 353).

Furthermore, since the Rocket in the novel plays the central role as the 'text', the characters' reaction toward its existence reflects Pynchon's views over language. For example, the Herero tribes people, who collect and archive pieces of V-2 rockets, whether scavenged from exploded rockets, 'duds', or otherwise, in order to construct a 'Counterforce' to 'Rocket 00000', that is, the 'Rocket 00001'. The tribespeople are divided into two groups: those who fall on the side of Enzian's myth of an 'Eternal Center', which is a kind of industrialized 'Kirgiz Light', and which the launched counter-rocket will actualize; and those who fall on the side of 'the Empty Ones', who invest all of their libinal energy in the rocket, leaving none for biological reproduction, thus committing themselves to a kind of redeemed 'tribal suicide'. Looking meticulously through the metaphoric significance of the rocket, one can observe how illocutionary as well as perlocutionary forces are at work in the way that they instigate the tribespeople to take different paths in reaction to the rocket as a linguistic symbol.

Significantly, a member of the cartel network, Gerhard von Goll, who participates in developing the German V-2 rocket, is also a documentary filmmaker who creates a counter-intelligence document about 'black rocket troops' who operate a launch pad in some obscure forest; Goll's men even deliberately torch the 'set', leaving behind half charred documents specially prepared to seem 'authentic'. Even the sex-slave of Captain Blicero, Gottfried, appears in this counter-intelligence film wearing 'black-face', a kind of allegorical mockery of the passages poeticizing the immaculate 'whiteness' of his 'Northern' skin and his 'golden' hair. Later, at the book's conclusion, Gottfried is 'married' to 'Rocket 00000', literally, when Blicero 'ties' him (pun intended) to the rocket.

Pynchon allows for Goll's document to serve as allegorical commentary on Blicero's 'other love', the young Herero *Enzian*, whom the Captain had met while stationed in Africa. Hilariously, the filmmaker gradually begins to believe that he has created the actual 'Counterforce', the actual 'Schwarzkommando'. Goll believes he has brought something ideational 'into being' through his film. Moreover, Quilligan points out that Enzian, during the latter part of his quest through the 'Zone', gradually realizes that the 'Holy Text' may not be the material 'Rocket 00001'. Enzian confronts his mythic search, Quilligan tells us, "only to realize fairly late that not the rocket, but postwar ruined Europe is the text" (213).

It appears that 'they' have manipulated Enzian's 'reading' of his quest, and Slothrop's too, by projecting the rocket archetype as desirable and worth attaining, as the words used have far stronger perlocutionary effects as one might guess. They are manipulated through the illocutions they could not decode, much like the projection of certain movie stars by Hollywood. By this allegory, Pynchon examines the promise of 'the frontier' as 'white metropolis', 'city on the hill', 'the American West' or otherwise. His most direct examinations can be found in the last section of *Gravity's Rainbow*, which is titled 'The Counterforce': it interweaves Enzian's 'disillusionment', Slothrop's 'disappearance', and Gottfried's 'Ascent', with disparate stories, including a biography of 'Byron, the immortal bulb' an industrial counterpart to the 'Khirgiz Light' on a more civilian level than Enzian's 'Rocket 00001'.

In line with Quilligan and many other Pynchon critics, Deborah L. Madsen (1991) believes that *Gravity's Rainbow* represents the 'archive fever' of a community and its leader(s) in negotiation over the control of 'discourses', those bodies of knowledge which modernity says are available to us as units of 'truth-value': "[I]ndividual allegoric texts are able to present a self-conscious account of the way cultural discourses seek social validation and also the way in which these cultural discourses authorize certain configurations of cultural power," (56) Madsen clarifies. Again, Pynchon allegorically represents this negotiation generally through 'the Elect' and 'the Preterite', and particularly through a continual intrusion of the Hollywood movie references into the narrative; his novel makes a distinction between truth-value, as embodied by disparate (and competing) discourses, and a mythical, epiphanic 'Truth' which certain characters seek on their typical quest. As discussed by Benjamin Paul Spencer:

"Madsen notes that ideologies play a part of the exaggerated and exclusive use of myth. In modern communities, this exclusive use breeds the spectacle of the mass Hollywood films, with its 'star system' of celebrity archetypes. Pynchon expresses that all ideologies totalize, whether in the service of a cinematic, literary, religious, political, military, business or scientific organization: in *Gravity's Rainbow*, it is a matter of how that totality unfolds. For this 'Great American Novel', it is not a matter of wondering, 'What is 'Truth'?' it's a matter of examining what represents truth-value and when, how much, and to whose benefit". (Spencer 55)

Lifeworld versus system

The theory of Communicative Action is best known, however, for the striking perspective it provides on how we should understand modernity or in our case the society, which Pynchon depicts in *Gravity's Rainbow*. This theory provides one with a spectacular outlook through which one can observe the working of latent and unconscious elements in the transformation of Lifeworld to System.

Habermas offers a two-level interpretation of the modern world, in which a distinction is drawn between the rational potential implicit in 'cultural modernity' and the selective or one-sided utilization of that potential in 'societal processes of modernization'. The cultural potential of modernity constitutes the critical standpoint from which particular aspects of Western modernization can be judged negatively. What Habermas means by this is that the modern culture has made available a 'rationalized lifeworld', one in which actors consistently carry the expectation that the various validity claims raised in speech are to be cognitively distinguished, and that they have to be redeemed in different ways. As such, a lifeworld emerges; an increasing number of spheres of social interaction is removed from guidance by unquestioned tradition and opened to coordination through consciously achieved agreement. Simultaneously, with this advance in communicative rationalization, there also occurs an advance in the rationality of society as measured from a functionalist or systematic perspective. This latter sort of

rationalization means that there is an expansion of social subsystems that coordinate action through the media of money (capitalist economy) and administrative power (modern, centralized states).

However, as is the case in *Gravity's Rainbow*, the initially beneficial expansion of these media has progressed to the point that they increasingly invade areas of social life that have been or could be coordinated by the medium of understanding or 'solidarity'. Modernization in the West has thus generated a pathology: an unbalanced development of its potential. Habermas refers to this phenomenon as a "colonization of the lifeworld" that brings in its wake a growing sense of meaninglessness and dwindling freedom, "the very exact example being Slothrop, who having the most possible media in his hands to use, is the least free person there, and even his body has been controlled by them since his childhood" (Finlayson, 2005 56). Although Habermas acknowledges the contributions of the system to social life, he is keen to point out the inherent dangers with system integration. "For one thing, systems of money and power steer agents toward ends that are not related to understanding or consensus. Nearly all the characters are conditioned, each towards a particular pre-planned set of goals" (55).

Lifeworld agents coordinate their actions through validity claims. The constraints on their actions that are generated by this process are self-imposed and internal as much as they arise from the reciprocal recognition of validity claims. By contrast, systems of money and power impose external constraints on action that are in no way up to the agents. The system thus takes on the appearance of what Habermas calls a block of quasi-natural reality, an independent reality with an autonomous internal logic that escapes human control, and for which human beings cannot and need not take responsibility (Ibid, 55). The best example for this block of reality is Roger Mexico.

Timothy Melley in his book *Bodies Incorporated: Scenes of Agency Panic in Gravity's Rainbow* refers to an incident in which Roger Mexico and Ponitsman are walking and wondering about their existence. Mexico begins to lose his heart imagining that they have become pieces and units of information to be processed. Here, it is observed how lifeworld has been supplanted by the system, a system in which actors cannot find the origin for their actions and by whom they are controlled. They feel themselves to be data particles at a small scale, embedded within a reticulated network at a larger scale.

This idea of human mechanization bulks large in Pynchon's oeuvre; for example, in Pynchon's *V* Itague castigates Kholsky. "Your beliefs are non-human," he says, "You talk of people as if they were point-clusters or curves on a graph". Kholsky replies, "So they are" (380). *Gravity's Rainbow* works on the same par with *V* on this ground. The figure of Slothrop is a good case in point for such inhumanity and deindividualization; it is as if he has been created through a mathematical model or equation and works through certain mechanical and formulaic patterns. On this account, one should bear in mind the illocutionary as well as the perlocutionary aspects of Austin and the perlocutionary III as explicated by Habermas; how communication is manipulated through these locutionary processes and one is made to behave as desired by those who have the upper hand and consequently replacing his lifeworld with their own system.

This problem of disintegration from within seems to overwhelm most of the characters in *Gravity's Rainbow*. On this ground, a good case in point is Pokler who eventually feels he is being abstracted from his material body into vaguer spaces:

He would become aware of a drifting-away [...] some assumption of Pokler into the calculations, drawings, graphs, and even what raw hardware there was [...] each time, soon as it happened, he would panic, and draw back into the redoubt of waking Pokler, heart pounding, hands and feet aching, his breath catching in a small voiced hunh-Something was out to get him, something here, among the paper (405–6).

One basic strategy underlying the communicative actions in *Gravity's Rainbow* is the subtle and oblique way by which power and control are exerted upon the actors without their being conscious of the process. When a structure or a society is governed in a totalitarian mode, control and influence penetrate its individuals who are its most basic elements. It seems that individuals themselves are guilty, due to their innocence or ignorance, of this absorption; an example in the novel is Feldspath who seems to be unaware of his potential action towards an autonomous existence. On this ground, individuals, on the one hand, and societal structures on the other, are mutually constructive; with society forming and shaping individuals, and individuals reflecting the inherent characteristics of the society.

Also, speaking in philosophical terms, one can observe that the characters experience a sense of identity crisis through a mathematical impersonation at work throughout *Gravity's Rainbow*. Slothrop is the prototypical example of this impersonating process. At the outset, he seems to possess a specific individuality, a locus entangled with experiencing his lifeworld. When the system, however, usurps the lifeworld at the large scale, individuals suffer at the smaller scale. As in the case of Slothrop, he falls apart with his body and spirit disseminated across the continent. Paradoxically, he comes to understand and grasp his personhood when it is lost and grabbed by the system which controls him.

Taking hints from Slade, it is easy to become sidetracked by the Shells and I. G. Farbens, Pynchon's shorthand for power structures. Before the end of *Gravity's Rainbow*, it is clear that 'we' are at fault with the politicians, military functionaries, bureaucrats, and corporate administrators. What began with an admirable attempt to control entropy ends with the attempt to control the lives of men. Rationalized systems bind and afflict but also reward the elect with power and money, the damned with order and security. Control derives from many sources and 'routes of power' but principally from the belief of both groups that the world of things is determined, that things are supposed to be that way because the system cannot be changed. Without consent from the benighted, rationalized systems cannot stand, yet to revolt is to revolt against the 'world' itself.

Colonization of the lifeworld

Looking back at the example of Halins in Chapter Two, we recognize that his situation is an example of what Habermas refers to as the colonization of society's lifeworld, which is the proper home of communicative rationality, by impersonal forces of money and power tied up with functional imperatives embedded in society's system. Substantively, Halins' analysis brings to mind Habermas' own account of the decline of the early bourgeois public sphere, one aspect of which was the increasing commercialization of newspapers in the nineteenth century. Habermas shows that modern societies consist in a fragile equilibrium between the system and lifeworld. Furthermore, because the system is embedded in the lifeworld, and indeed parasitic on it, the latter has priority. According to Habermas, the lifeworld is a self-standing and self-replenishing medium, whereas the system is not. The system can only operate based on resources of meaning that come from the lifeworld. This thesis is partly empirical; however, Habermas bases it on the conceptual argument for the priority of communicative action. Since the lifeworld embodies patterns of communicative action and the system embodies patterns of instrumental action, and since communicative action is prior to instrumental action, the lifeworld must be prior to the system. "The problem is that although the system is embedded in and depends on the lifeworld, the former tends to encroach upon, to displace, and even supplant the latter. This tendency of the system to colonize the lifeworld leads to greater fragility and to disequilibrium or instability. The notion of the colonization of the lifeworld refers to a complex of eventually harmful historical and social processes" (Finlayson 56). To begin with, the steering media of money and power become uncoupled from the lifeworld; the capitalist economy and the administrative system become gradually detached from the spheres of family and culture, and the institutions of the public sphere such as the mass media. As the networks of instrumental action increase in their density and complexity, they gradually intrude into the lifeworld and absorb its functions. Strategic decisions are left to markets or placed in the hands of expert administrators. The transparency of the lifeworld is gradually obscured and the bases of action and decision are withdrawn from public scrutiny and from possible democratic control. As the domain of the lifeworld shrinks, a whole gamut of what Habermas calls social pathologies arise, which include, but are not limited to, the negative effects of markets on the non-market domains they colonize.

The consequences are:

1. Decrease in shared meanings and mutual understanding (anomie)
2. Erosion of social bonds (disintegration)
3. Increase in people's feelings of helplessness and lack of belonging (alienation)
4. Consequent unwillingness to take responsibility for their actions and for social phenomena (demoralization)
5. Destabilization and breakdown in social order (social instability)

Reverting to Slade again, we saw that in *The Crying of Lot 49* and *Gravity's Rainbow* characters strive for a belief in an organic whole, usually by indulging in paranoia in an attempt to establish "connectedness". The longing for continuity is profound and pervasive. At the beginning of *Gravity's Rainbow*, for example, Pynchon places this quotation from Werner Von Braun: "Nature does not know extinction; all it knows is transformation. Everything science has taught me, and continues to teach me, strengthens my belief in the continuity of our spiritual existence after death". Near the end of the same novel, the narrator wishes for something to "bring us back a continuity, show us a kinder universe, more easygoing" (726), all in order to escape alienation.

Most of Pynchon's characters believe that the information comes from 'outside,' that their senses are like movie cameras recording what is there, but an occasional character worries that he is instead a projector, that something 'inside' is responsible for the film he sees and hears. This fear of solipsism sharpens the analogy and permits Pynchon to extend its implications: Human beings know for certain that they are only functioning, not who or what is in control and not whether they are true automata or mere servomechanisms.

Individuals are sufficiently like the latter to be programmed, and the major plot line of *Gravity's Rainbow* expands from a behaviorist experiment that conditions Tyrone Slothrop by means of stimulus and response. When Slothrop appears to escape control, to respond paradoxically, he is tracked by a desperate behaviorist who wants to dissect his brain structures, for those who seek to control others are just as much prisoners of a belief in determinism as those they victimize. Behind this variation on the Frankenstein theme is the haunting and luminous-possibility that Slothrop is a Messiah, the first wholly 'natural' cybernetic system. His conditioned response to a mysterious stimulus may not have been extinguished 'beyond the zero' ["Nature does not know extinction..."]; he will end as pure transformation. In any case, the analogy turns not so much on whether man is literally a machine but on whether he has free will or can alter a pattern of control that has existed, Pynchon thinks, throughout the history of Western culture.

Slade further asserts that the development of cybernetics has been checked by the concurrent and in many ways interrelated-progress of linguistics, which has turned its attention to 'natural' language as opposed to the 'artificial' mathematical language of cybernetics. Through the mathematical notations of transformations, often borrowed from cybernetics, linguists have discovered structures in human language.

In subtexts in *Gravity's Rainbow*, Slothrop meets Marvy's Mothers, the bigoted avatars of the aggressive, technological country whose policies will serve as a matrix for the post-war history. What he hears from them are the rocket limericks, insanely cheerful celebrations of machination. Although these mothers do not understand their own message, their message is the matrix. Their words make plain that we risk destroying ourselves through our lust for technology and control.

Conclusion

As it was depicted, Pynchon's use of incomplete fragmented sentences and putting the characters in situations in which the locution is manipulated towards strategic actions show his ideas about the corrupted modern life or in other words, the crippled modern communication. Hence, Pynchon's use of a huge number of signs provided him with the context in which his characters' use of speech acts in what, using Habermas' terminology, can be called 'the opposite of communicative action'. In that way they basically hide the 'Elect's' real goal in using discourse, as communicative as it may seem, and by so doing keep the controlled people from having the actual understanding of the strategic level of discourse. These controlled people would not be able to get the perlocutionary effects of the uttered speech and so they themselves help the 'Elect' create the system and colonize the lifeworld. Thus, it can be observed how a communicative system can be used in a way that it divides the society into two groups of the oppressors and those oppressed; those who have the locutionary system at their hand and those who are mere consumers of such communicative systems.

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